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COMMENT
IMPEACHING CREDIBILITY THROUGH
EVIDENCE OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS:
FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 609(a)
I.

INTRODUCTION

The question whether prior convictions of criminal offenses
should be admitted as evidence to impeach the credibility of a witness has long been debated in the courts of the United States.' An
attempt was made by Congress to end the controversy with the
adoption of rule 609(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which
makes it clear that impeachment by evidence of prior convictions
is permissible in some situations.2 But, two years after the rule
became effective,3 the controversy continues, now centering on what
kind of prior convictions can be used to impeach under the
"dishonesty or false statement" clause of rule 609(a)(2).
Rule 609(a) defines two categories of convictions which, when
being used to impeach, receive differing treatments.4 First are convictions for crimes which are punishable by death or imprisonment
in excess of one year.5 These are crimes which, in most jurisdictions,
would be considered felonies.
The second category, crimes involving "dishonesty or false
statement,"I creates a problem for judges. Courts have reached differing decisions as to what crimes constitute "dishonesty or false
statement."' As a result, in this particular instance, the Rules have
1. See R.G. Spector, Impeachment Through Past Convictions: A Time for Reform, 18
DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (1968); M. Ladd, Credibility Tests-Current Trends, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 166
(1940).
2. FED. R. EVID. 609(a). Rule 609(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides:
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or
established by public record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which
he was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty
or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
3. The Federal Rules of Evidence became effective on July 1, 1975.
4. See note 2 supra.
5. Before this type of conviction may be admitted into evidence, the court must determine that the probative value of the evidence outweighs any prejudicial effect to the defendant. See note 2 supra.
6. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2).
7. Compare Virgin Islands v. Testamark, 528 F.2d 742 (3rd Cir. 1976) with United
States v. Carden, 529 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1976). The court in the former case held that petty

Published by eCommons, 1978

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3:2

failed to achieve their objective of uniform application of evidentiary rules in the federal court system.8
This comment will assess the impact of rule 609(a) from several
perspectives. First, a thorough examination of Congressional records will be made to arrive at the Congressional intent behind the
phrase "dishonesty or false statement" in rule 609(a)(2). Secondly,
the case law which has developed in the first two years interpreting
that clause will be reviewed. Thirdly, other problem areas in rule
609(a) will be discussed.

II.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

The Federal Rules of Evidence are the product of thirteen years
of study by numerous government committees.9 One of the most
vigorously disputed rules was rule 609(a).' 0 As originally proposed
by the Supreme Court, rule 609(a) permitted impeachment by evidence of convictions for crimes which would be: (1) "punishable by
death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under
which he was convicted, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement regardless of the punishment."" This proposal was rejected by
the Special House of Representatives Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice. 2 The Subcommittee amended the Supreme Court Advisory
Committee's version by adding to subsection one "unless the court
determines that the danger of unfair prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence of the conviction." '' 3
The proposed rule was then sent to the House Judiciary Committee where it again was amended, this time to permit impeachment of a witness by prior conviction only if the crime involved
larceny was not a crime which involved "dishonesty or false statement" as used in rule
609(a)(2). The exact opposite decision was made in Carden.
8. S. REP. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 7051-52.
9. Id.
10. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 609-14 (1976).
11. Id. at 609-13. For a discussion of the history of the Federal Rules of Evidence prior
to the Supreme Court proposal, see S. REP. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEwS 7051-52.
12. H. REP. No. 93-650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [19741 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 7075, 7084. This proposal followed existing case law more closely. See, e.g., Luck
v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C.
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968). Under the above cases, the trial court judge
was given the discretion to admit evidence of prior convictions after consideration of the (1)
nature of the crime; (2) the time of conviction and the witness' subsequent history; (3) the
similarity between the past crime and the charged crime; (4) the importance of defendant's
testimony; and (5) the centrality of the credibility issue.
13. H. REP. No. 93-650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 7075, 7093.
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"dishonesty or false statement."' 4 In explaining this major change,
the Committee stated that
because of the danger of unfair prejudice in such practice and the
deterrent effect upon an accused who might wish to testify, and even
upon a witness who was not the accused, cross-examination by evidence of prior conviction should be limited to those kinds of convicon credibility, i.e., crimes involving dishonesty
tions bearing directly
5
or false statement.'
Although this proposal radically differed from the original recommendation by the Supreme Court, the House passed it on to the
Senate.
In the Senate, the bill was referred to the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, where proposed rule 609(a) again underwent a
major transition. Agreeing with the House Judiciary Committee's
fears of prejudice to the defendant, the Senate advocated a differentiation of defendant witnesses from non-defendant witnesses.'" As to
the former, the Committee allowed impeachment by prior conviction only if the offense involved "dishonesty or false statement. '"'7
For the first time, however, the phrase "dishonesty or false statement" was defined:
[T]he committee means crimes such as perjury or subornation of
perjury, false statement, criminal fraud, embezzlement or false pretense, or any other offense, in the nature of crimen falsi the commission of which involves some element of untruthfulness, deceit or falsification bearing on the accused's propensity to testify truthfully.'"
But, with respect to non-defendant witnesses, impeachment by
prior convictions would be permitted not only by crimes involving
"dishonesty or false statement," but also by crimes which were
felonies.'" The Committee added a safeguard by permitting impeachment by felony convictions "if, and only if, the court finds
that the probative value of such evidence outweighs its prejudicial
20
effect against the party offering the witness.
Impeachment by any of the above methods was limited, how14.
15.
16.

Id.
Id. at 7084-85.
See S. REP. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [19741 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 7051, 7061.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. But, the committee concluded that "proof of any prior offense otherwise admissible under rule 404 could still be offered for the purposes sanctioned by that rule." Id.
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ever, to cross-examination.' Thus, if the accused did not testify,
evidence of his prior convictions was barred.2" But, if the defendant
chose to testify, misrepresentations made in response to defense
counsel's questions or in the course of cross-examination regarding
the nature or existence of a prior conviction may be rebutted by
evidence of the record of such prior convictions. Also, if the defendant made representations about "attitude toward or willingness to
commit a general category of offense," such representations may be
rebutted.2 3 The Committee concluded, however, that the prosecution may not "circumvent the purpose of this rule by asking questions which elicit such representations from the defendant."2 4
Because of the variations between the rules as passed by the
House and those passed by the Senate, 5 the bill was referred to the
Joint Conference Committee for reconciliation. Subsequently, the
rules were revised and approved, and became law on July 1, 1975.
Specifically, rule 609(a) was revised again, in a compromise
measure. The Conference Committee adopted the Senate version,
but added an amendment requiring that if the crime was a felony
the court must weigh the probative value of the evidence against the
prejudicial effect to the defendant.26 Recognizing that the phrase
"dishonesty or false statement" was ambiguous, the Committee's
report approved the definition proposed by the Senate Judiciary
Committee.2 7 When the evidence offered is of a prior conviction for
a crime which meets this definition, the court must automatically
admit such evidence. There is no judicial discretion allowed under
rule 609(a)(2).25
If, however, the prior conviction would fall under rule 609(a)(1),
"the Conference determined that the prejudicial effect to be
weighed against the probative value of the conviction is specifically
the prejudicial effect to the defendant."29 The Committee specifi21. Id.
22. Id. But see comment to note 20 supra.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. As stated in text, see text accompanying note 14 supra, the House version of rule
609(a) permitted impeachment only if the prior conviction was for a crime which involved
"dishonesty or false statement." The Senate proposal would also allow impeachment if the
crime was punishable by death or imprisonment for over one year. See text accompanying
note 19 supra.
26. H. CONF. REP. No. 93-1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 7098, 7102.
27. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
28. H. CONF. REP. No. 93-1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 7098, 7103.
29. Id. (emphasis in original).
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cally rejected considering any prejudicial effect to non-defendant
witnesses.
[Tihe danger of prejudice to a non-defendant witness is outweighed
by the need for the trier of fact to have as much relevant evidence on
the issue of credibility as possible. Such evidence should only be
excluded where it presents a danger of improperly influencing the
outcome of the trial by persuading the trier of fact to convict the
defendant on the basis of his prior criminal record2.
Rule 609(a) as finally adopted provides that evidence of a prior
conviction for any crime involving "dishonesty or false statement"
may always be used to impeach any witness during crossexamination." Evidence of a prior felony conviction for a crime
which does not involve "dishonesty or false statement" 'may be
admitted for impeachment purposes only if the court determines
that the probative value exceeds the prejudicial effect to the defen32
dant.
33
The presence of the words "only if the court determine[d]"
is a change from the rule as recommended by the House of Representatives Subcommittee. That Committee proposed to admit such
evidence "unless the court determine[d] that the probative value
exceed[ed] the prejudicial effect to the defendant. 31 4 Thus, under
such wording, the court did not have to exercise its discretion to
prevent prejudicial effects. The burden of showing a prejudicial
effect was on the defendant, even though the evidence would most
likely be offered by the prosecution.
The final version of rule 609(a), however, mandates a ruling by
the court that the evidence does not have an overriding prejudicial
effect. As a result, the proponent of the evidence, usually the prosecution, will have to persuade the court that the35 probative value
outweighs the prejudicial effect to the defendant.
The practical result of rule 609(a) is that, in a criminal case, a
prior felony conviction will always be admissible to impeach a prosecution witness because there could not possibly be a prejudicial
36
effect to the defendant.
30. Id.
31. 120 CONG. REC. H12253 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974) (Statement by House Subcommittee Chairman, William L. Hungate), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7108,
7110. This is subject to the time limitations imposed by rule 609(b).
32. Id.
33. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
34. See note 13 and accompanying text supra (emphasis added).
35. 120 CONG. REC. H12253 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974) (Statement by House Subcommittee Chairman, William L. Hungate), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7108,
7111.
defendant is attempting to impeach a prosecution witness by a
But where the
36. byId.
Published
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JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS

Since the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in July,
1975, the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal have had numerous opportunities to apply rule 609(a)(2). A leading case dealing with the
question of what crimes involve "dishonesty or false statement" is
United States v. Smith.37 Judge McGowan, in writing for the majority, applied the definition of "dishonesty or false statement" set out
in the Joint Conference Committee Report." The court concluded
that "attempted robbery is not a crime involving 'dishonesty or false
statement' within the meaning of rule 609(a)(2)." 3 0
Similarly, the court rejected the government's contention that
robbery should be admitted because it is an offense in the nature of
"crimen falsi."4 o
[R]obbery may not be classified legitimately as an 'offense in the
nature of crimen falsi.' Congress clearly intended the phrase to denote a fairly narrow subset of criminal activity. Moreoever, research
into the derivation of the term 'crimen falsi' indicates that Congress's
(sic) restrictive construction comports with historical practice ...
[T]he expression has never been thought to comprehend robbery or
other crimes involving force. 4

Applying this rationale, the court followed an earlier ruling in
United States v. Millings,42 which held that prior convictions for
carrying a pistol without a license and possession of heroin, both
misdemeanors, did not involve "dishonesty or false statement." 3 In
overruling the trial court, Justice Robb asserted that "intent to
prior misdemeanor conviction, it must meet the definition of "dishonesty or false statement."
See United States v. Thompson, 559 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1977).
37. 551 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
38. See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
39. United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d at 362. Although attempted robbery could have
been admitted under rule 609(a)(1), the prosecution attempted to get the evidence admitted
under rule 609(a)(2) as involving "dishonesty or false statement." In this manner, the prosecution avoided the balancing test of rule 609(a)(1). It is interesting to note that the trial court
did not apply the Federal Rules of Evidence, even though they were in effect at that time.
551 F.2d at 357.
40. BLACK's LAW DiCTONARY 446 (rev. 4th ed. 1968), defines "crimen falsi" as:
[T]he term involves the element of falsehood, and includes everything which has
a tendency to injuriously affect the administration of justice by the introduction of
falsehood and fraud. A crime less than felony that by its nature tends to cast doubt
on the veracity of one who commits it. This phrase is also used as a general designation
of a class of offenses, including all such as involve deceit or falsification; e.g., forgery,
counterfeiting, using false weights or measures, perjury, etc. Includes forgery, perjury,
subornation of perjury, and offenses affecting the public administration of justice.
41. 551 F.2d at 362.
42. 535 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
43. Id. at 123.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol3/iss2/11

COMMENT
44
deceive or defraud is not an element of either offense." Therefore,
5
these convictions merit the same treatment as a simple assault,
since none of the crimes would be peculiarly probative of credibility.
A literal reading of Millings would require that an intent to
deceive or defraud actually be an element of the crime, not that the
crime, in general, would be characterized as involving deceit or
fraud." Although the difference may seem purely semantic, the
crimes which fit the definition under Millings are limited. Only
those crimes which, by express statutory statement, require proof of
an intent to deceive or defraud could be admitted into evidence
under rule 609(a)(2). Not only would this interpretation narrow the
field of convictions which may be used, it would also remove all of
the uncertainty. Each jurisdiction's criminal statutes would limit
impeachment by prior convictions to those crimes which required
proof of an intent to deceive or defraud before a conviction could be
had. Unfortunately, the Smith court did not take notice of that
approach used in Millings.
Smith and Millings have been the only cases dealing with impeachment under rule 609(a) in the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia. Although both decisions purport to be applying the definition of "dishonesty or false statement" as set forth in
the Conference Committee's Report, there is a slight difference in
interpretation. Millings would require deceit or fraud as a substantive element of the crime before it would be admitted under rule
609(a)(2). Smith, however, puts emphasis on the title of the offense
and how it was committed, and if the method used to commit the
47
crime was fraudulent or deceitful, it would be admissible.
Similar decisions were handed down in two cases in the third
circuit, both involving prior convictions for petit larceny. The court
in Virgin Islands v. Toto48 concluded that petit larceny does not fit
into the class of crimes described by "crimen falsi," because it is not
a crime "involving, or at least relating to, communicative, often
verbal, dishonesty." 49 In a companion case, Virgin Islands v.
Testamark,5 ° decided the same day, the court merely reiterated its
decision in Toto.

44.
45.
F.2d 202
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
See United States v. Belt, 514 F.2d 837 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Carlsen v. Javurek, 526
(8th Cir. 1975).
See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
See 551 F.2d at 364, note 28.
Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278 (3d Cir. 1976).
Id. at 281.
Virgin Islands v. Testamark, 528 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1976).
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But, the Toto court did recognize that under some circumstances petit larceny could possibly fit the "crimen falsi" category.
"It is conceivable that a conviction for petit larceny might subsume
a crime in the nature of crimen falsi, e.g., 'petit' stealing by false
pretenses. There is no indication that the petit larceny involved
here was other than ordinary stealing."'" In that respect, Smith and
Toto are in agreement.
The difficulty of applying rule 609(a) is clearly exemplified by
United States v. Carden, a Fifth Circuit decision which reached the
conclusion opposite from that reached in Toto.12 Treating rule
609(a) very lightly, the court simply stated that "the issue is
whether the trial court erred by admitting evidence of a petty larceny conviction of appellant Roy Carden. We believe that this impeachment evidence was admissible since the crime at issue involved dishonesty."5 3 Interestingly enough, the Carden court cited
Smith as contradictory authority,5 4 but concluded without explanation that even if this were error, it would not constitute grounds for
reversal. 5
A similar conclusion was reached in a Seventh Circuit case,
United States v. Papia.58 The defendant was charged with using
extortionate means to collect a debt, and when he testified, the
prosecution inquired into a prior misdemeanor conviction for theft.
Not only did the defendant allege error in the admission into evidence of the conviction for impeachment, but also claimed the prosecution exceeded the permissible scope of questioning.57 The latter
argument was quickly rejected by the court. "We have no doubt
that, if it was proper for the Government to cross-examine Basile
at all about his prior misdemeanor conviction, no error was committed in eliciting from Basile the type of institution from which he

stole the money...

''58

Applying rule 609(a)(2) to determine whether evidence of the
misdemeanor conviction was admissible, the court quoted the Random House College Dictionary definition of dishonesty-"a disposition to lie, cheat or steal." 59 Thus, "a common sense approach to the
51. 529 F.2d at 281, note 3. Because this case came to trial before the Federal Rules of
Evidence became effective, the statements concerning rule 609(a) are dicta.
52. 529 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1976).
53. Id. at 446.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 560 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1977).
57. Id. at 845.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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language of rule 609(a)(2) would support the conclusion that Basile's prior conviction was admissible because theft is a crime involving 'dishonesty' within the common meaning of that term.""0 Because of the variance between the common meaning of "dishonesty"
and that set forth by the Conference Committee, the court concluded that "reasonable men may disagree about whether a witness's (sic) propensity to steal reflects upon his honesty in a manner
that bears adversely on his propensity to tell the truth."',
Despite the above analysis, the court sidestepped the issue in
its ultimate decision. In a conference outside the presence of the
jury, the trial judge was informed by the prosecution that the original charge on the prior conviction was forgery, but was plea bargained down to the misdemeanor theft charge. 2 Based upon this
information, the court permitted the evidence to be used for the
purpose of impeachment.Y
By contrast, in United States v. Ortega, a Ninth Circuit decision, a misdemeanor conviction for shoplifting was not permitted to
be used to impeach under rule 609(a)(2).14 Although the decision
quoted the explanation of "dishonesty and false statement"
adopted in the Conference Committee's report, the court elected to:
adopt the views of the Third Circuit in Toto because it accords with
the expressed intent of the draftsmen of Rule 609, limiting the
'dishonesty and false statement' language to those crimes that involve some element of misrepresentation or other indicium of a propensity to lie and excluding those crimes which, bad though they are,
do not carry with them a tinge of falsification. 5
The cases cited above demonstrate that the paramount problem with rule 609(a)(2) is whether the "dishonesty or false statement" clause should include theft offenses. A number of state courts
that have adopted rule 609(a)(2) have also faced the same issue.
Of those state courts that have held prior convictions for theft offenses admissible under rule 609(a)(2), most have followed the reasoning in Toto and Papia.
60. Id. at 846.
61. Id. at 846-47.
62. Id. at 847. The prior conviction was actually for false statement and forgery on a
loan application. Id.
63. Id. at 848.
64. 561 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1977).
65. Id. at 806.
66. See, e.g., People v. Ray, 36 I1. App. 3d 283, 343 N.E.2d 560 (1976) (misdemeanor
App. 3d 691, 325 N.E.2d 336 (1975) (armed robbery); Fletcher v.
theft); People v. Dee, 26 Ill.
State, 340 N.E.2d 771 (Sup. Ct. Ind. 1976) (theft).
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Even the courts that reject the view that stealing, without more,
involves "dishonesty" that bears on a witness's (sic) veracity, recognize that modern theft statutes may encompass criminal conduct
that does fall within the ambit of Rule 609(a)(2) ....Accordingly,
these courts have adopted the rule that, when the statutory offense
of which the witness was convicted does not require proof of fraud or
deceit as an essential element of the crime, the prior conviction may
yet be admitted under Rule 609(a)(2) if the proponent of the evidence
bears the burden of showing that the conviction 'rested on facts warranting the dishonesty or false statement description.' 7
A careful analysis of this reasoning reveals that it is consistent
with the intent of Congress. The Conference Committee's definition
merely requires "some element of untruthfulness, deceit, or falsification."68 If the court, after examining the background of the prior
conviction, finds such an element is present, even if not obvious by
the description of the offense, it would be proper to admit evidence
of that conviction.
This approach, however, is not totally fool-proof. The court
must keep in mind that rule 609(a) deals with impeaching the credibility of witnesses by prior conviction-not by the circumstances
which led to the prior conviction. In Papia, for example, the judge
decided to admit evidence of the prior misdemeanor conviction because he was informed that the original charge had been forgery-which is specifically included in the Conference Committee's
definition of crimes involving "dishonesty or false statement." But,
the prior conviction was for petty theft, not for forgery. As a result,
Papia was impeached by evidence of a crime separate and distinct
from the crime for which he was convicted.

IV.

PRACTICAL REQUIREMENTS OF RULE

609(a)

Apart from determining the meaning of "dishonesty or false
statement" as used in rule 609(a) (2), courts have had other difficulties applying rule 609(a). One such problem involves the scope of
questioning about prior convictions once it is determined that such
convictions should be admitted. Two months after the Federal
Rules of Evidence became effective, the Seventh Circuit dealt with
that issue in United States v. Harding." The defendant, on trial for
the sale of cocaine, was questioned by the prosecution about a prior
conviction for possession of marijuana. Rule 609(a)(1) permits the
67. United States v. Papia, 560 F.2d 827, 847 (7th Cir. 1977), quoting United States v.
Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 364 at note 28 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
68. See note 18 supra.
69. 525 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1975).
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use of evidence of this type after a determination by the court that
the probative value of the evidence exceeds the prejudicial effect to
the defendant. To avoid possible prejudicial effect, "the scope of the
examination is strictly limited."7 ° The law is well established that
7
it is error to inquire about the details of prior criminal conduct.
The rationale behind this rule is that a prosecutor can convince a
jury that the defendant committed the present crime because he has
done so in the past:
When the prior conviction is used to impeach a defendant who
elects to take the stand to testify in his own behalf, two inferences,
one permissible and the other impermissible, inevitably arise. The
fact that the defendant has sinned in the past implies that he is more
likely to give false testimony than other witnesses; it also implies that
he is more likely to have committed the offense for which he is being
tried than if he had previously led a blameless life. The law approves
of the former inference but not the latter."2
This effect on the jury is even more profound when the prior offense
and the present charge are similar. Therefore, when that is the case,
the court must strictly control the questioning in order to prevent
prejudice. In this regard, the Hardingcourt stated, "Both the prosecutor and the court had a duty to minimize the risk that the jury
would infer guilt on the cocaine charge from the fact of a recent
conviction of a marijuana charge."7
Although the court in Harding did not define what the limitations upon the prosecution were, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
in United States v. Tumblin did. 4 The prosecutor in Turnblin not
only inquired about specific details of the prior conviction, for example, length of confinement, length of time between arrests and
defendant's history of unemployment, but also re-emphasized them
during his closing argument. In holding the scope of questioning too
broad and prejudicial, the court asserted that proper examination
would have been confined to the:
number, date, and nature of previous convictions on crossexamination. . . . The obvious significance of this questioning was
not to damage defendant's credibility as a witness-the fact of conviction alone achieved that goal-but instead to suggest, quite impro70.
71.
427 F.2d
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 88.
United States v. Pennix, 313 F.2d 524 (4th Cir. 1963); United States v. Mitchell,
644 (3d Cir. 1970); United States v. Dow, 457 F.2d 246 (7th Cir. 1972).
525 F.2d at 89 (7th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 90.
551 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1977).
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perly, that defendant was a man who had spent most of his young
life committing and serving time for crimes. ....
7.
Precisely because of the possibility of a prosecutor's misuse of
evidence of a prior felony conviction, rule 609(a)(1) requires the
court to balance the probative value of the evidence against the
prejudicial effect to the defendant.76 The rule, however, does not
give any guidelines for the court when making this determination.
Thus, the question of what is required of the judge was raised in
United States v. Mahone.77 The trial judge made a pretrial ruling,
after argument by attorneys, that, "[I]f the defendant takes the
stand and testifies, the Court will permit, on the basis of the record
now before it, impeachment of this defendant in the normal manner
by the robbery conviction." 7
The defendant argued "that the court erred by not making an
explicit determination on the record that the probative value of the
evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect to the defendant." 7' Although the appellate court did not agree with the appellant's contention, the court did "urge trial judges to make such determinations after a hearing on the record, . . . and to explicitly find that
the prejudicial effect of the evidence to the defendant will be outweighed by its probative value." 0
When making this determination, the court suggested that
judges apply the factors articulated by Judge Burger in Gordon v.
United States.8 ' These factors are: (1) the nature of the crime; (2)
the time of conviction and the witness' subsequent history; (3) the
similarity between the past crime and the charged crime; (4) the
importance of defendant's testimony; and (5) the centrality of the
82
credibility issue.
V.

CONCLUSION

The rationale behind rule 609(a) is two-fold. First, it is important that the trier of fact have all possible information before ruling
on a defendant's guilt. But, it is highly important that the trier of
fact also have the benefit of the defendant's testimony, and the
75. Id. at 1004.
76. FED. R. EVID. 509(a)(1).
77. 537 F.2d 922 (7th Cir. 1976).
78. Id. at 928.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 929.
81. 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968).
82. Id. For an in-depth discussion of the application of each factor, see 3 J.
& M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 609-62 (1976).
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testimony of any witnesses for the defendant. Secondly, the jury
should also be informed about the character of a witness who asks
the jury to believe his testimony. 3
In attempting to accomplish these goals, rule 609(a) builds on
the assumption that a witness' record of prior convictions is indicative of a propensity to testify falsely. "[T]he reason for disbelieving
the witness is his supposed readiness to lie inferred from his general
readiness to do evil which is predicated upon his former conviction
of a crime." 4
There is considerable debate, however, over whether this is a
valid assumption. 5 Indeed, the assumption does not seem to reconcile with one of the goals of this country's criminal justice system-rehabilitation of the criminal. However, it may be that Congress lacks faith in the ability of the present penal system to rehabilitate offenders. It is ironic that after being convicted of a crime, even
one as minor as petty theft, and then serving the imposed sentence,
the same court system which punished the offender will permit
evidence of that conviction to impeach unless the requisites of rules
609(b) or 609(c) are met.8"
Rule 609(a) also comes dangerously close to contradicting the
cornerstone of our criminal justice system-that an accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The practical effect of making
a defendant choose between testifying, knowing that the jury may
be informed of prior convictions, and not testifying, in which case
the jury will receive only one side of the story, is to prematurely
stamp the defendant guilty. Studies indicate that the introduction
of past convictions increases the rate of conviction by twenty-seven
per cent. Likewise, failure of the defendant to testify results in a
thirty-seven per cent increase in convictions.8 7
With the above facts in mind, it is hard to see the real need for
rule 609(a). The most just rule would not permit prior convictions
of the defendant to be used as a means of impeachment at all.
83. United States v. Garber, 471 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1972).
84. Ladd, Credibility Tests-Current Trends, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 166, 176 (1940).
85. R.G. Spector, Impeaching The Defendant By His Prior Convictions And The Proposed Federal Rules Of Evidence: A Half Step Forward And Three Steps Backward, 1 Loy.
CHI. L.J. 247 (1970).
86. FED. R. EVID. 609(b) and 609(c). Rule 609(b) provides, in part, that "evidence of a
conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than 10 years has elapsed since
" Rule 609(c) provides, in part,
the date of the release of the witness from confinement ..
that "evidence of a conviction is not admissible under this rule if (1) the conviction has been
the subject of a pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure based on a substantial showing of rehabilitation ....
87. Spector, supra note 85, at 249-50.
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Although the need to protect society from crime is great, so is the
need to protect an accused's right to a fair trial. One should be
convicted upon the facts presented by the prosecution, not upon
prior convictions. As the studies cited above indicate, evidence of a
defendant's prior convictions has an adverse effect on the jury which
cannot be overlooked. The probability that a jury will convict a
defendant because of the defendant's past criminal activities is so
great that the ability of a defendant in such a predicament to obtain
a fair trial is suspect.
It does not appear, however, that Congress is willing to adopt
the position that evidence of prior convictions should not be admissible to impeach a defendant's credibility. Until such time, rule
609(a) will permit impeachment by evidence of prior conviction for
any crime which involves some element of "dishonesty or false statement," as well as by any crime which is punishable by imprisonment in excess of one year, following an explicit ruling by the court
that the probative value exceeds the prejudicial effect to the defendant.
Ronald T. Bella
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